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The unmethodical and irrational approach of
the Common Lawyer to the question of criminal
responsibility has often been remarked by those
who have trained under more rigorous systems.
The empiric gropings of the Common Lawyer
tend to be dismissed as of little value by those who
have dedicated their working lives to a disciplined
search for basic normative principles in this field
of criminal law.' Much of the difficulty lies in the
peculiarly imprecise terminology with which the
Common Law has seen fit to saddle itself and
behind which the Common Lawyer finds it con-
venient to hide on occasion. Nowhere is this un-
fortunate tendency more pronounced than in the
matter of criminal responsibility and perhaps no
term is so vague and unsuited to the purposes for
which it is used as that curious latinism, Meres
Rea.2
Mens Rea does not possess a respectable ped-
igree' and like so many legal institutions, having
been taken out of one context to be set in another,
1 See, for example, Tratado de Derecho Penal, 5
Lurs JIhtfNEZ DE ASOA, EDITORIAL LOSADA 56 (Argen-
tina, 1956).
2The forthright stricture of a leading American
comparative criminal lawyer is worth repeating:
"There is probably no criminal law teacher who would
contend either that he fully understands our Anglo-
American doctrine of mens rea (at least the writer has
not found a single satisfactory comment in the English
language) or that he can satisfactorily explain to his
students the concept of mens rea (which is a recur-
ring problem in all the cases) or indeed that he can tell
his students that Anglo-American mens rea is sensibly
used to achieve rational, consistent and functional
results." Mueller, The Teaching of Comparative Criminal
Law in the Course of Criminal Law, 11 J. LEGAL ED.
61 (1958). Professor Mueller has himself come a long
way since those words were written, but it is doubtful
if he would wish even now to change their import.
3 In the form in which it has come to influence our
criminal law one might be pardoned for seeing it as
yet another of Sir Edward Coke's doubtful legacies.
See Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HAnv. L. Rv. 988 (1932).
Stephen says of this in a footnote on Coke's supposed
authority: "I do not know where he quotes it from", 2
STEPHEN, HISTORY OF T CuNAL LAW OF ENG-
LAM 94 (1882). See also Dubin Mens Rea Reconsidered,
18 STA l. L. Rav. 351 (1966).
it has never quite settled down to acquire its own
very definite orientation. Like the foreign body it
is, it has only been tolerated through the system
having grown a hard tissue around it. Has the
time not come for a little modern surgery upon
this malignant growth of four centuries? Among
the voluminous literature on the subject, we have
over the years been treated to one learned exposi-
tion entitled simply "mens rea",4 another "a
rationale of mens rea",5 while but lately we have
been favoured with a most percipient study of
"mens rea reconsidered". 6 The present modest
offering might well be subtitled "Is mens rea a
necessary concept?" It will be argued here that it
is not.
As a preliminary it is as well to observe that
the word "responsibility" itself is capable of
bearing a variety of technical meanings.Y This
fact would, perhaps, not be of so great import
were the distinctions in its usage easily perceived.
Unfortunately, they are not and the word tends to
be used with a lack of discrimination, which is
puzzling to jurists whose legal lexicon is both
richer and more precise than that of the Common
Law.8 What is here meant by criminal responsi-
bility is a conjunction of legal and factual circum-
stances by reason of which some person is called
upon to answer to a court of competent jurisdic-
tion for that which he has done or failed to do.9
The problem is basically one of accountability. 10
4 Sayre, op. cit. supra note 3, at 974-1026.
5 Perkins, A Rationale of Mens Rea, 52 HARv. L.
Rxv. 905 (1939).6 Dubin, op. cit. supra note 3.
7 See the penetrating analysis: Hart, Varieties of
Responsibility, 83 LAW QUART. RaV. 346 (1967).
s In fairness, one must state that others are guilty of
like imprecision. See the numerous examples cited by
Jimgnez de Asfia, op. cit. supra note 1, at pp. 39, 88.
9 Compare Stephen: "I understand by responsibility
nothing more than actual liability to legal punishment",
op. cit. supra note 3, at p. 96. See also, Silving, Gult: A
Methodological Study, 32 REVIsTA JUPDICA DE PUERTO
Rico 18 (1963).
10 See Hart, op. cit. supra note 7, at p. 363.
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
There are clearly some things we can do or omit
to do under any legal system without having to
give an account of ourselves to anybody. It is
evident, then, that any study of this question of
responsibility must begin by seeking out that
factor by which we might be called to account by
the criminal law from those which do not involve
us in any such liability to respond for what we
have or have not done. At the root of any partic-
ular investigation lie two generally unexpressed
questions: What was done or omitted?, and why
was it done or omitted? The first question always
demands an answer for it touches the very content
of the criminal law itself: until we know what was
done we cannot measure the activity against the
matrix of postulates we have pre-determined for
the purpose of regulating certain behaviour. It is
really the second question which causes us the
most trouble in the study of responsibility, for
whether it is asked or not, and the manner in
which the answers to it are evaluated, is one of
the most characteristic features of any particular
system of criminal law. If we ask why a particular
act was done or why someone omitted to act, it is
clear that we expect a response. Moreover, we are
not primarily interested in the response for the
purpose of establishing motive. Sometimes, how-
ever, the Anglo-American criminal law does not
even put the question; it is content simply to know
that something has been done or not done. It is
very important to a study of responsibility to
know exactly what it is that determines whether
or not this secondary question is asked and it is
here that we begin to expose the unmethodical
nature of the Common Law.
The Common Lawyer is in the habit of reducing
certain types of crime to two basic elements, an
overt act or omission, the achs reus and an accom-
panying mental condition, the inens rea. The latter
has been succinctly and authoritatively described
as a "legally blameworthy condition of mind"."
When we ask why something was done, in the
expectation of receiving a legally relevant answer,
we enter upon the realm of mens rea. We measure
that answer against certain conceptualised mental
states in order to establish a correspondence with
the elements which necessarily make up the other
part of the juristic figure. We exclude those intel-
lectual elements which the law considers too remote
and we distinguish between the relevant and the
irrelevant. Sometimes, we do not do this at all.
n 10 HALsuxy's LAws op ENGLAND 273 (3d ed.).
The infraction of the law is established upon the
receipt of the answer to the question: what was
done? It is usual to speak in such cases of offenses
in which mens rea is not an essential element
12
indeed we could logically categorize these crimes
of strict or absolute liability as ones in which mens
rea is not an element at all. This tends, to the
unguarded eye, to give the impression that such
crimes contain no intellectual element at all," but
this is obviously not the case; one cannot, even
in abstract terms, conceive of an act or omission
entirely divorced from the state of mind of the
human agent with whom it is associated. Yet it
would be true to say that the principal, present-day
justification for maintaining the body of learning
pertaining to the doctrine of mens rea is that it
serves to distinguish certain crimes by reason of
its presence from those in which, as an ingredient,
it is not required. If it did this job well, there
would be strong reason for retention of the doc-
trine. In fact, it does it so badly as to give rise to
quite unnecessary controversies, such as whether
a particular state of mind is or is not mew rea
14
and the various presumptions of evidence which
require consideration when a written enactment
is silent as to the precise state of mind envisaged
by the criminal concept, which it seeks to define 5
The term vnns rea does not, therefore, cover all
mental states accompanying criminal activity nor
does it provide, in itself, a means of distinguishing
the class of intellectual elements to which it does
refer. It is submitted, quite forthrightly, that its
only value is the highly unscientific one of pre-
venting the proper analysis and classification of
the various mental states which accompany ac-
tivity that the legal system has chosen to desig-
nate as criminal.
The idea that lies behind the concept of mens rea
is really a very simple one. As moral notions have
come to permeate the criminal law, it has seemed
improper to condemn what was done without
first enquiring why it was done and then paying
careful attention to the answer given.16 This
1Ibid. 274.
13 Stephen seems to imply this, op. cit. supra note 3,
at p. 95.
14 See, for example, Professor J. C. Smith's confident
assertion: "of course, negligence is not mens rea".
Smith, The Gilty Mind in the Criminal Law, 76 LAw
QuA xT. REv. at p. 98 (1960).
15 See HALSBURY, op. cit. supra note 12.16Perkins reminds us that "Deeply ingrained in
human nature is the tendency to distinguish intended
results from accidental happenings" but points out
that "the translation of this into normative terms is a
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individualization of responsibility is a necessary
preliminary to "making the punishment fit the
crime".17 As our notions of criminality become
more refined, so has our examination of the state
of mind which accompanies that behavior, which
it is the policy of the criminal law to prevent.
The careful attention paid to this process has long
given rise to the belief that there is no one state
of mind that can be comprehended under the
term mens rea, but rather a number of distinct
manifestations, having at times little in common
with each other beyond association with conduct
which the law has designated criminal. 8 This latter
is an important point which is not always given
the attention it deserves. The criminal law is
concerned primarily with conduct and it is always
this association of a certain mental state with
some behaviour which the law seeks to forbid,
which results in that mental element being cate-
gorised as "legally blameworthy": the mental
element becomes tainted as it were by association.
What is it that determines this link of association?
The answer is simply those extra-legal factors
which may conveniently be termed criminal
policy. It is criminal policy which dictates our
attitude towards the general question of respon-
sibility 9 and in the matter of mens rea that policy
has vaguely laid down that the law ought not to
condemn an act or omission of a certain type unless
the mental state accompanying this activity is of
a certain quality. The principle, which really
distinguishes those crimes for which mens rea is
required from those for which it is not, is the
relevance of the mental state to the objects of
criminal policy. In the case of crimes of strict
liability, the mental state associated with the
prohibited activity is simply not relevant to the
question of responsibility; the law is not concerned
to know why, in the narrow mens yea sense, some-
thing was done; it is only concerned to estab-
lish that it has been done. It is this authoritative,
non-individualistic policy concept that mens tea,
late and sophisticated development". op. c1t. supra
note 5.
1 See Parker, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime,
77 HARv. L. Rxv. 1071 (1964).
18 This was Stephen's view (op. cit. supra note 3, at
p. 95), and this was shared and elaborated on by
Sayre (op. cit. supra note 3, at p. 1026).
11 See Stephen, op. cit. supra note 3, at p. 98: "Gen-
eral theories as to what ought to be the conditions of
criminal responsibility may not be useless, but they
must depend on the tastes of those who form them and
they cannot, so far as I can see, be said in any distinct
sense to be either true or false."
with its seemingly legalistic appeal, seems to rebut.
If it is absent as a requirement, it seems that an
opportunity to reply or respond in legally useful
form is absent and this is precisely what the lawyer
does not like."0 Granted then, that as a matter of
policy we should wherever possible ask why some-
thing was done and evaluate the answers, can we
do this without mens rea? Most assuredly we
can.
In the first place, we must pay a proper and
more respectful attention to the role of criminal
policy and recognise it for what it is, namely an
extra-legal determinant of the substantive and
adjectival content of the system. It is a question
of policy whether or not we ask why some particu-
lar activity took place and thereupon assess the
blame according to the answer received. We cannot
therefore judge the matter of "the propiety of public
welfare laws creating 'strict' criminal liability",2
for example, by reference to legal criteria. The
policy considerations determining responsibility
are all essentially pre-legal, but they affect and
color not merely the content of the legal concepts
to which they give rise, but also their manipula-
tion in practiceY Effective discussion of respon-
sibility can, however, proceed only on the basis of
a strict separation of the legal and the pre-legal
and it is the failure to do this which has bedevilled
so much of the Common Law thinking in this
field and given rise to the laboriously involved
learning on nens rea. Behind all our condemnatory
vocabulary, guilt, culpability and like words,
lies a scarcely recognised notion of a pre-judgment,
not of the individual who stands accused of some
conduct, but rather of the issue itself in policy
terms.2 When we of the western world say it is
20 See Dubin, op. cit. supra note 3, at p. 344.
21 Ibid. 324.
22 Dubin (ibid. 369) makes this interesting observa-
tion: "Although the substantive-procedural distinction
has gained wide currency in virtually every area of
law, there has apparently never been any meaningful
attempt in legal philosophy to analyse its definitional
scope. The reason is probably that the distinction being
fundamentally descriptive, represents substantially
different ideas in different legal contexts. The core
signification in this supposedly hairsplitting distinction
nevertheless is its suggestion of a basic analytical
differentiation between the essential subject matter of
laws and the ancittiary, implementational manner and
method of applying and enforcing that subject matter."
"Compare Silving, op. cit. supra note 9, at p. 24:
"Whatever may be the nature of blameworthiness, the
latter is undoubtedly conceived of as implying a moral
value judgment, and perhaps the most crucial issue in




Vrong to eat people, we have already made a policy
,decision based upon the cultural and social facts
-of our existence; we have sat in judgment upon the
-question and issued a normative precept which
-secures its concrete expression through the formal
machinery of our criminal law. When we speak of
responsibility in the sense in which it has been
-defined here, we are also issuing a concept that
has been the subject of a previously debated but
•-differently resolved policy judgment. It is necessary
.as a pre-requisite to break these policy considera-
tions down to their barest elements. What, in
-other words, are the factors that enable us to say
that such and such a person shall be accountable
for certain acts or omissions and how shall we
-designate these elements for the purpose of erec-
ting a theory of responsibility?
The notion of responsibility may be conven-
iently reduced to the following elements. Firstly
there must be postulated some act or omission
-which the law forbids; this may be designated the
"content factor". Secondly, there must be envis-
aged some juristic person deemed capable by the
law of doing that which is forbidden; this may
be termed the "personality factor". Finally, there
are those intellectual elements so closely associated
with the prohibited activity that they cannot be
regarded as having an existence independently of
it; these elements, which comprise all those states
of mind found in conjunction with the content
factor may be called the "mental element".4
Reduced to these three elements or factors, it is
clear that it is only the third which is going to
give rise to serious controversy in the matter of
criminal policy. Problems of content rarely arise
save in a crisis situation where a political entity
is in the course of violent change from one pre-
vailing philosophy to another. It is for this reason
that the evolution of new delictual concepts is
generally rather a slow process even where some
new state of affairs supersedes that which had
formerly been subject to penal controls deriving
2 4 What is meant here is something much wider than
that mind-act relationship to the difficulties of which
Dubin adverts (op. cit. supra note 3, at p. 360). Mental
elements is intended to embrace here even those
elements which are now considered as part of the actus
reus. See Smith, op. cit. supra note 14, at pp. 82-83.
Glanville Williams usefully warns: "It is a common
error to suppose that crimes are divided into sharply
defined classes, some requiring intention as to every
element, some recklessness as to every element, some
negligence as to every element, and some being wholly
strict." WIrLiAMs, TaE MxfETAL ELmMEN IN Cansx,
27 REVISTA JURfDICADE LA UNlvRsmDAD DE PUERTO
Rico 203 (1957).
from completely different political criteria.25 As
a general question related to responsibility, there-
fore, we need not concern ourselves here with the
content factor. What this shall comprise, in prac-
tical terms, in any particular system, will be
adequately determined by the ordinary processes
of evolution of that system -which, while they may
not always function with the perfection or rapidity
desired by reformers they rarely provoke grave
dissatisfaction with their workings. 6 The second
and third elements have a strong connection and
are often treated as forming a single entity. It is,
however, but a singular connection that gives rise
to this relationship and although of considerable
importance it has seemed better to make the
separation. When we ask who shall be accountable
for having done or having failed to do something
by reference to our content factor, our answer will
be given not merely in terms of status but with
additional regard to certain mental elements. For
the notion of responsibility must imply, necessarily,
not merely some human agency which might
undertake the physical task of response, but also
some directing intelligence capable of instructing
that such response be made on its behalf or of
undertaking the task itself. We enter into an
inconvenient fiction when we extend the use of
the term criminal responsibility as it has been used
here to inanimate objects, which can have no
innate directing intelligence.? It is otherwise
with those juristic persons to whose artificial
being the machinery of the law has attached the
means of arriving at the directive element. Thus
"company policy" or "the sense of the meeting"
are capable of being comprehended under the
artificial phenomena of the law as we can under-
stand, for example, in other contexts, the "Will of
Congress". The kernel of the problem in regard to
the personality factor is this matter of directive
intelligence, which permits a response to be made
before the law. We face here two situations, one
25 See, for example, the interesting article: Bucholz,
The Devdopment of Economic Criminal Law, LAW
AND LEGISLATION IN rHE GERmAN DEMOCRATIC
REPuBLIc, No. 1, 17 (1967). It demonstrates the
persistence of criminal legislation deriving from the
pre-war regime even under the vastly changed con-
ditions to which the new socialist republic was trying
to adjust itself.
26See 1 MAT-0nMM., COMPARATIVE CPrMOLOGY
22-67 (1965).
27 "It is hard for us to acquit ancient law of that
unreasoning instinct that impels the civilised man to
kick or consign to perdition, the chair over which he
has stumbled", "The history of English Law", 2
POLLOCK & MAiTLAND 274 (2d ed. 1923).
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legal, the other factual. The law, by its nature,
confers upon certain agrupations or entities cer-
tain rights and duties that require its oversight.
The question arises as to the extent to which these
entities might be called upon to respond, qua
entity, before a court of criminal jurisdiction. This
is esentially a legal question and its resolution is
according to strictly legal and, on that account,
artificial criteria.2 The second situation concerns
those human beings whose intelligence is so im-
mature or impaired that, as a matter of fact, they
are unable to respond adequately for what they
have done. As a purely arbitrary act, the criminal
jurisdiction of any regime can attribute blame in
respect of disobedience to its dictates; it cannot,
however, hold all persons responsible, for some
lack, as a matter of fact, of the requisite "respond-
ability". Responsibility, as used here, always
implies capacity to respond and the criteria which
the law devises as a determinant of that capacity
are artificial and often controversial.2 9 It is all
too easy to become involved in this controversy at
the expense of the substance of the question,
which is simply the recognition of this capacity
factor in the element denominated personal-
ity.
If we ask at what age shall a child be called to
account for what it has done or failed to do there
is dearly a stage at which fact would preclude us
from requiring response, as where a two year old
child playing with matches razes the family
property to the ground. Equally clearly we are
elsewhere cast back upon the artificiality of the
law. What do you do if the child is eight, or ten,
or twelve?30 There emerges, therefore, a doctrine
of factual irresponsibility, of which, by its nature,
the law must take account and a legal irresponsibil-
ity which arises when the policy of the law deems
28 As is the case in regard to the criminal responsi-
bility of that quasi-legal person, the English trade
union. See also, The Criminal Liability of the Hundred",
in 1 MArrLAND, COLLECTED PAPERS 230-246 (1911).
2See, for example, the interesting test of exception
from punitive responsibility by reason of mental
incapacity, propounded in Silving, The Criminal Law
of Mental Incapacity, 53 J. CRI. L., C. & P. S. 129
(1962).
30 Stephen says, refering to legal competence, "The
age at which a person becomes competent to commit a
crime must necessarily be fixed in an arbitrary man-
ner". Op. cit. snpra note 3, at p. 97. Thus the Ingleby
Committee on Children and Young Persons, 1960
(Cmnd. 1191, H.M.S.O.) recommended that the age of
responsibility be raised from 8 to 12, but the recom-
mendation was not accepted and subsequent legislation
raised the age to 10 years. Children and Young Persons
Act, 1963, 10 & 11, Eliz. C. 37.
that a person seemingly capable of responding is
relieved from the necessity of doing so. It is with
the latter that we are principally concerned as the
factors which motivate policy here have a sim-
ilarity to those which require more extensive
examination in connection with the third of our
elements of responsibility. In the case of these
persons from whom the law cannot, legally or
factually, require a response the language of
responsibility is inappropriate. We may say, there-
fore, that they are irresponsible in the sense that,
whatever we may attribute to them they cannot
be expected to answer back. We may apply to them
measures of social control, such as the restrictions
imposed by mental health legislation or enact-
ments designed to place infant offenders against
the criminal law in the care of public authorities.
It is irrelevant, however, to ask that "why?" of
the concept of responsibility which is designed to
evoke a response in intellectual terms, for the law
presumes there to be no guiding intelligence upon
which its mechanisms might usefully operate.
When we come to our third factor we are at
once confronted with the rival theories of strict
or absolute responsibility, which demands an
answer regardless of why the prohibited activity
took place: responsibility becomes simply a matter
of "Did you do it?," and a more enquiring doc-
trine, which seeks to bring the actor to account
not merely by reason of his having done or not
done something, but because the mental state
which accompanied that activity is considered
thereby to be reprehensible.
. It is an observable fact that our Anglo-American
system of Common Law shows a marked preference
for a theory of responsibility which requires that
the person accused of having done something
contrary to its dispositions be not only given the
opportunity of telling why he did what was
forbidden, but that his answer be taken into
account in deciding whether he is to be condemned
or absolved.3 This preference is expressed in terms
of mens rea and we find it necessary to consider
what it is that is "blameworthy" about this state
21 See Dubin, op. cit. supra note 3, at 326-327:
"Given certain circumstances, X (the accused) should
not be punished for having done Y (the proscribed
harm) because punishment is not justified; and in law
there would be an applicable exculpatory principle,
doctrine or rule. The explicit and implicit use of this
basic statement-form in deciding questions of responsi-
bility is evident throughout the literature of excuses.
All questions of criminal responsibility arise and may
be profitably studied within the compass of this basic
statement form and its four subcontexts."
[Vol. 59
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of mind. It seems here a pointless exercise trying
to determine precisely why our legal policy should
incline towards what might be termed a liberal as
opposed to a strict theory of liability; the reasons
lie somewhere beneath the tangled skeins of our
social, religious and ethical development. It seems
more important to note that it is simply a prefer-
ence, not an invariable postulate and it is neces-
sary to ask what it is that determines at times
that a person should be accountable simply for
having done something, while at others his respon-
sibility is dependent upon the further factor of
why he did it.
It is suggested that the erection of a doctrine of
strict lability is the result of an extra-legal policy
decision when the psychological repugnance of
requiring an answer from one who cannot effec-
tively respond is overcome by the social necessity
of attributing blame to the person who can be
fairly shown, by the law's machinery, to have
done that which was forbidden. There is a good
deal of practical common sense underlying our
technical theory of responsibility, and this operates
not only in the personality sphere, where at times
its manifestation is more obvious, but also in the
matter of the mental states which can be demon-
strated to the law's satisfaction as having accom-
panied some particular conduct. Thus it is against
common sense to require of someone that he
account for his having done something when it is
manifest that his state of mind, at the time of
doing that of which he stands accused, is such
that he cannot give an answer that is of any value
for the law's immediate purpose, which is simply
to condemn or absolve. In terms of responsibility,
as distinct from culpability, which involves the
attribution of blame, we ought only to be con-
cemed to know why somebody did something if
we can effectively take his answer into account. To
hold a man responsible when he cannot effectively
answer is to ignore his answer altogether and to
treat the matter, constructively, as one of strict
liability. At times our system is forced into this
awkward choice because it treats of the mental
element not merely in terms of responsibility, but
also, at one and the same time as a factor in the
attribution of blame and thus, proceeding rapidly
a stage further, in the assessment of punishment.
Concerning ourselves solely with the mental
element in relation to responsibility, we may
conclude that this should always be taken into
account whenever it is going to weigh in the
balance of condemnation or absolution of the
offender. At times, criminal policy dictates that
it be ignored, overriding all other considerations;
the mental element in crime simply becomes ir-
relevant. At others we are dearly at a loss to
condemn or absolve without taking this factor
into account. The problem, as ever, is due to the
grey area in between. Yet it is in this terrain that
the crucial issues of responsibility must finally be
resolved.
Perhaps the best starting point is the criminal
law of excuses. A person is not held liable to
answer for what he has done or failed to do if it
can be shown that his behavior can be excused
according to one or more of the reasons admitted
by law.3 With the exception of those reasons,
which have to do with the personality factor,
these exculpatory circumstances all concern states
of mind which are considered to have some bearing
upon whether the offender ought or not to answer
for what has been done or omitted. If the person
to whom some transgression is imputed can show
that he acted through ignorance, mistake, accident,
or by reason of a coercion that overbore his will,
this is a vital factor in assessing whether he should
be absolved or condemned. It is, therefore, not
merely a factor in assessing blame, but a pre-
liminary to determining responsibility. The extent
to which we admit or deny the influence of
these exculpatory circumstances is a measure of
criminal policy in relation to the mental element
in crime. More than any other field, it is here
that we need a strong dose of rationalisation for it
is easily demonstrated that our policy is not al-
ways consistent, nor in conformity with the
principle of its liberal inclinations. 3  Much of the
inconsistency is due to the persistence of discussing
= This is at least as old as Bracton who states "we
must consider with what mind (animus) or what intent
(voluntate) a thing is done, in fact or in judgment, in
order that it may be determined accordingly what
action should follow and what punishment" Dx
LEGnus i(Twiss Edn. 1879) 1016, cited by Sayre, op.
cit. supra note 3, at p. 985.
3 "Anglo-American criminal law has never developed
a sound theory of excuses. A study of the historical
development of the criminal law of excuses has per-
suaded me that a primary reason for this shortcoming
is the traditional failure to impose any limitations upon
the invocation of the criminal sanction except those
that proceed from the purpose-of-punishment. As a
result, instead of formulating an independently sig-
nificant body of excuses designed specifically to protect
the liberty of the individual we have been largely
content to splice our concepts of responsibility on to
our concepts of harm." Dubin, op. cit. supra note 3, at
p. 346.
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these issues in terms of mens rea.34 Our Common
Law learning has been built up empirically through
the cases and the emergence and definition of
these exculpatory circumstances have been alengthy
and unscientific process. The unexpressed major
premise that has played so great a part in shaping
these concepts is the judges' notion at any par-
ticular time of what is the relevant criminal
policy in relation to the matter in hand. At times,
what is apparently a clear imperative cannot be
followed because it is against common sense or
would lead to an unjust result.35 So we have the
creation of exceptions which erode the seeming
firmness of a general principle and the beginnings
of irrationality in the whole structure through
this ad hoc rulemaking process. The first step in
rationalisation must be to bring order to these
scattered and sometimes defective principles,
where necessary ridding ourselves of those which
however entrenched and hallowed with the years,
do not accord well with the general tenor of
modem criminal law. This can and must be done.
There has hitherto been the tendency to regard
some of the data which must necessarily be con-
sidered as unmanageable in scientific terms. This
is a notion born of idleness and we have but lately
been shown the striking results that can be ob-
tained by the application of modem methods of
thinking to facts and situations which formerly
would have been the subject of vague and often
erroneous speculation.36
A rational theory of responsibility can only be
constructed by having simultaneous regard to a
sound doctrine of disposal.n We make people
31 As is the case with ignorance and mistake of law
and fact. See, for example, Keedy, Ignorance and Mis-
take in the Common Law, 22 HA'v. L. REv. 75 (1908).
Such thinking can at times lead to curious conclusions.
See Bolgdr, The Present Function of the Maxim "Ig-
norantia Juris Neminem Excusat", 52 Iowa L. REv.
at p. 633 (1967): "In connection with the role of intent
in the motivation of acts that violate penal laws, a
final word should be said about a curious exception to
the presumption of knowledge, or, in other words, to the
defense of ignorance of law. This is the doctrine of mens
rea."
35 Such is the case in relation to the English exception
to the rule that ignorance of the law is no defence,
where the accused proves that the statutory instrument
which he is charged with contravening had not been
issued by H.M.S.O. at the date of the alleged contra-
vention. See 10 HALsBuRY, at p. 284 and the cases cited
at note g.
36 See the illuminating article: Conard, The Quanti-
tative Analysis of Justice, 20 J. Legal Ed. 1, 20.
n"There is need for discussions of the mental ele-
ment in crime to be more closely related to moral issues
and the theories of punishment". Cross, The Mental
Element in Crime, 83 LAW QuAR. REv. at p 226.
responsible for infractions of the criminal law
with the express purpose of dealing with them so
that they are corrected in their error, punished as
appropriate, and prevented where possible from
repetition of that which the law has forbidden.
These purposes, as well as the wider one of intim-
idating like-minded offenders, are intimately
linked with the principles of establishing responsi-
bility. It is contrary to common sense to require
an answer from one incapable of giving it, if the
object of this exercise is to attribute blame that he
might be disposed of according to the corrective
regimen of the system. More than anything else,
it is this lack of correspondence between the prin-
ciples of responsibility and those of disposal which
causes disquiet with the doctrine of strict liability.'8
The conflict is really one of criminal policy. What
the law cannot regulate it must utterly prohibit,3 9
and amid the complexity of our modem society
the regulatory apparatus of the criminal law would
be enfeebled by the constant necessity of asking
reasons to which it cannot hope to attach sensible
answers in terms of responsibility. The choice is
between effectiveness of punishment, through the
suppression of crime by absolute prohibition and
the creation thereby of social discontent through
the correction or punishment of those who by
adherence to this doctrine of responsibility are
denied the opportunity of exculpation which
they might have had were their reasons for having
so acted taken into account. No reconciliation of
these conflicting principles is possible, only a
balance between them determined by the tolerances
in society, which, in themselves, are constantly
shifting.40 The theory of responsibility must always
therefore, be seen in relation to the general aims
of the law and must above all retain its intimate
harmony with the doctrine of disposal, regardless
of the shifts and stresses to which it might be
subjected in the process. There is an unfortunate
tendency to consider responsibility and disposal
as matters quite apart and unrelated to each other
and this has communicated itself to the codifiers.
The lawyer and lawmaker are in danger of aban-
doning the field of disposal to the social scientists
instead of playing their proper role in policy
determination. This trend should be reversed and
the lessons of history in regard to the intimate
3s WILLIAMS, op. cit. supra note 24 at p. 204, 207.
39 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, at p. 574.
40 As witness the English attitudes to responsibility
in regard to road traffic offences and bigamy.
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link between responsibility and punishment
should be more closely heeded.
The basic principle of a rational doctrine of
responsibility may be stated as follows: a person
shall be obliged to account for that which he has
done or failed to do as required by the criminal
law, when his conduct is accompanied by a legally
relevant state of mind. A state of mind shall be
legally relevant when the system requires that it
be taken into account for the purposes of attribu-
ting blame and assessing the consequences of that
attribution. The criterion of relevance is exclu-
sively the product of a policy decision based on
the choice each system must make, in its own
age, between the conflicting principles to which
reference has been made. The system should
require a state of mind accompanying criminal
conduct to be taken into account whenever the
result of so doing is calculated to create social
harmony in the matter of responsibility and to
reduce the tension produced by ignoring the felt
injustice in disregarding the intellectual element
pertinent to the criminal concept. This is another
way of saying that the legal system should always
favor taking into account the intellectual factor
unless its needs for unquestioning obedience to its
precepts are so pressing that these can dearly and
acceptably override the social phenomena which
incline against making a person responsible with-
out giving him the opportunity of showing, by
reason of his state of mind, that he ought to be
relieved of answering for what he is shown to have
done. It would follow that a state of mind is
legally relevant when it is material to consider
its relationship with the prohibited conduct for
the purpose of realising the objectives of the
criminal law and the preservation of the essential
harmony of the order. Thus, the states of mind of
the mentally incapacitated and the child of tender
years are legally irrelevant and their practical
association with prohibited conduct is not a
factor in determining responsibility. Similarly
other states of mind found in fact in association
with forbidden behavior are legally irrelevant,
because they do not fall to be taken into account
that the objectives of the law be effectively realised.
It follows, too, that while the concept of the
legally relevant state of mind is a general one,
there is no single condition fulfilling such a descrip-
tion, but rather a number of different categories
each of which is relevant or not according to the
circumstances and associations in which it is
found4 Thus, where the criminal law requires
that in association with particular conduct there
shall exist an intent directed to the realisation of
the specific act prohibited by the law, the existence
in conjunction with it, of a state of mind directed
to the realization of some other prohibited activity
which has not in fact been realized is legally ir-
relevant to the question of responsibility.42
The determination in every case of what is or
is not legally relevant is a policy decision and the
choice between such legally relevant states of
mind as intention and inadvertence is as artificial
and arbitrary as that governing the establishment
of personality factors, where these do not ex-
clusively rest upon factual exigencies. In every
case, however, the rational nature of the policy
choice can be preserved by strict adherence to,
the essential harmony of the penal system. It is
not necessary to base a doctrine of criminal re-
sponsibility upon uncertain grounds of morality
when it can rest more securely upon the hard and
observable facts of social life.
Having established the guiding principle of
responsibility it becomes much simpler to classify
the states of mind accompanying criminal con-
duct. While their classification is outside the
modest limits set for this article, it may usefully
be advanced that many of the problems, which
are simply the product of our confusing doctrine
of mes rea, would disappear were they viewed in
the light of a single harmonious principle which
extends from responsibility to disposal. Thus we
classify offenses in order of seriousness by reference
to certain policy objectives; it is not, for example,
the abhorrent nature of the crime that distin-
guishes murder from manslaughter, nor has it
been from the outset. If correction, or punishment
are to have any practical, as distinct from sym-
bolic, significance, it is dear that we must classify
that for which we intend to hold transgressors
responsible by reference to realistic factors. At the
simplest level, we must, therefore, distinguish
between one who sets out purposely to break the
criminal law and one who, while achieving this
result, has done so through inadvertence. In each
4
1 This accords both with Sayre's postulated "mentes
reae" and the modern legislative tendency of attaching
designated mental states to types of conduct which the
law seeks to prohibit or control.
42 As with the well known English case R. v. Pembli-
ton (1874) L.R. 2 C.C.R. 119. See also the case of R. v.
Prince (1875) L.R. 2 C.C.R. 154 and the comments of
Professor J. C. Smith, op. cit. supra note 14. Belief as
to the girl's age is irrelevant in these crimes."
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case the policy of the law is to prevent the infrac-
tion and to retain intact its provisions against
further encroachment. It is in relation to the latter
that the question of precise definition of the actor's
mental state is material, because it is at this point
that the policy of the law starts to direct itself to
the safeguarding of the future. A person should
answer for what he has done partly to repair the
breach he has thus made in the law and partly to
close the gap against future transgressors. In this
matter of the classification of states of mind, for
the purpose of creating criminal concepts, we have
a choice between the frank recognition of the
artificiality of the law and adherence to a scheme of
criminal responsibility based upon an attempt to
establish responsibility according to the facts.
There does not seem to be a compromise choice.
In the first case we must accept that the law may
deem a person's mental state to be of a different
order from what it actually was, thus holding him
responsible for a consequence that in fact he had
not intended. This we do whenever we make
inadvertence in any of its degrees a blameworthy
mental element in the establishment of responsi-
bility. Our only means of redressing the seeming
unfairness of this is to reduce the gravity of the
offence, in terms of disposal, as we do in the case,
for example, of murder and manslaughter. The
43 Fitzgerald reminds us that "The offence of murder
n English law is by no means the same in all respects as
only alternative would be to limit responsibility
to intended consequences in every case, a result
which would be disastrous for the policy of the
criminal law. We see, therefore, that the doctrine
of responsibility plays a vital role in the classifica-
tion of crime and thus in the selection and forma-
tion of what has been called the content factor. If
we do not accept this we are driven back upon
fictions, which seek to mitigate, through legal
means, that severity of the law which our extra-
legal policy ought to have regulated preliminarily
with greater accuracyM A rational doctrine of
responsibility must eschew these fictions and by so
doing will assist materially not only in the more
accurate elaboration of types of criminal conduct,
thereby encouraging the necessary element of
certainty in the criminal law, but also in bringing
into sharper focus the objectives of the criminal
law that these might be the more readily intelligible
to the lay public. Obedience to the law's precepts,
which is after all the ultimate objective, will thus
be more easily attained.
the corresponding offence in other legal systems".
Fitzgerald, Crime, Sin and Negligae, 79 Law Auar.
Rev. 354 (1963). It is well to recall that murder orig-
inally bore a very special meaning in English law that
clearly revealed the policy considerations underlying it.
44For an excellent illustration of the problem see
Silving, Toward a Rational System of Criminal Law, 32
REVISTA JURIDICA DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE PUERTO
Rico 134 (1963).
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